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The story is well-known.  In 1883, the United States Congress passed the Pendleton Civil 
Service Act, establishing a merit-based public service system in the federal government.  
Borrowing from a previous British reform, the act established a Civil Service 
Commission whose job it was to wrest the public service from the control of party bosses.  
Now, with the passage of the Pendleton Act, “patronage-mongering methods of 
administration” were to be relegated to the corrupt and partisan past; a new era of 
professional government was at hand.
1  
  
Except, of course, that it wasn’t.  Indeed, the story less often told is that of the first half-
century of the civil service in the United States, when its future was far from assured.  
The old patronage system yielded only slowly to the reformers.  Indeed, it was not until 
the 1930s that the Civil Service Commission could claim extensive incorporation of the 
federal public service in the “new” system.
2  Thus, long after reformers had declared 
their victory over the forces of patronage and spoils, control over recruitment into 
government office was still being contested and negotiated with the politicians who 
claimed the jobs for “their people.”
3  In the U.S., the career civil service was politically 
constructed—and not easily.    
  
Today, the same kind of conflict over public sector employment is being played out in a 
number of Latin American countries.  Patronage—the discretionary allocation of public 
sector jobs to reward followers and to cement political and personal relationships—
continues to be a dominant way government is staffed in most Latin American countries.  
Its use in the governance of Latin America has a long tradition, of course, easily dating to 
the conquest, if not before.  Indeed, across empire and republic, civil war and unity, 
authoritarian and democratic regimes, centralized and decentralized administrations, 
economic growth and stagnation, rural and urban contexts—patronage systems have 
endured and flourished.  Although pressures are mounting to replace patronage-based 
public administrations with career civil service systems, the region’s older systems are 
proving resistant to the imprecations of reformers, as was the case in the United States a 
century before.   
 
At the heart of the resilience of Latin America’s public sector patronage systems are the 
benefits they offer to those who manage them.  Electoral and party support-building are 
the reasons most often given for the widespread use of patronage; the distribution of jobs 
can mean more votes for a candidate or a party or can be used to pay off political 
obligations after an election.  Moreover, at times politicians have employed patronage as 
a tool to bring about significant policy reform and improved performance of government 
by bringing in “their people” to support change.  Thus, the ability to colonize often rigid or ineffective bureaucratic organizations with those who share commitment to new policy 
agendas or to bring highly qualified technocrats and skilled professionals into the public 
service in short order are valued opportunities for many reform-oriented presidents and 
their ministers.  And, of course, the use of patronage can be a means to personal 
enrichment through corruption.  Thus, because patronage systems are useful for a variety 
of purposes, from vice to virtue, they do not yield easily to reform initiatives.   
 
Despite the utility of patronage systems, all major countries in Latin America have 
legislation establishing a formal civil service system, even while patronage remains 
widely in evidence.  In this paper, I explain the anomaly between law and reality by 
showing that the fate of career civil service reform initiatives is generally determined 
after they have been legislated.  Implementation, not law, determines the persistence of 
patronage and shapes the characteristics of emergent career services.  Thus, efforts to 
introduce neutral and stable public services are on-going processes in which the 
construction of new systems is constantly threatened by deconstruction and 
reconstruction.        
 
Many scholars, of course, have pointed to the importance of the implementation process 
for determining policy outcomes, and particularly for demonstrating how policy 
intentions go awry during this process because of competing interests, the electoral 
motivations of politicians, corruption, or inequalities in power that ensure that some are 
more likely to receive policy benefits than others.
4  In this paper, studies of reform 
initiatives in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile certainly confirm that implementation 
is fraught with opportunities for distorting the intent of law.  More importantly, these 
studies indicate the ubiquity of similar strategies used by the opponents of reform for 
offsetting the impact of new legislation.   
 
Some agencies, for example, seek to opt out of a new system.  Those who resist change 
also work to kill the organization charged with implementing the reform or to starve the 
responsible organization of funding and/or opportunities to hold recruitment 
examinations or competitions.  In addition, they often seek to redefine the reach of the 
system through legislation.  Finally, and universally, those who wish to continue to 
benefit from patronage find alternative ways of hiring personnel, often through temporary 
appointments or through new categories of personnel created to avoid the structures of 
civil service legislation.     
 
In the cases presented here, each of these strategies has been used.  Taken together, such 
strategies have been remarkably successful in blocking the systematic implementation of 
civil service laws.  Nevertheless, there is evidence that public sectors in each of the case 
study countries have made advances in the degree of stability, professionalism, and 
expertise in public offices.  This has generally occurred at the organizational level, where 
some agencies or ministries have wrested control of recruitment from partisan influence 
and have even used patronage to hire and retain well-qualified staff and build strong 
reputations for good performance.  In some instances, organizational level career services 
have evolved and elsewhere, quasi-career systems have emerged, even when not 
sanctified through regular civil service channels.  This suggests that there are significant 
  2pressures on governments of Latin America to improve the performance of their public 
sectors and to ensure greater autonomy, professionalism, and stability.  An important 
question raised by the paper, then, is whether the legislation of civil service systems is the 
best or only way to achieve these goals. 
      
Phantom Civil Services 
 
Patronage in the public service is found in all political systems, of course, and usually 
characterizes the top level positions in government, acknowledged to be essential to 
political leaders to support their policy initiatives and to provide them with advice and 
leadership of public organizations.  In some contexts, however, appointment for personal 
and/or political purposes is a primary route to a non-elected position in government.
5  
Patronage systems are regularized, widely acknowledged as a customary (if not always 
legally recognized) form of appointment to public employment, independent of any 
systematic examination or credentialing system.  These systems can be controlled and 
contested by the executive, the legislature, political parties, unions, or economic and 
social elites.  They can be created and maintained for distinct reasons, but are, above all, 
a mechanism available to political and administrative actors to expand and maintain their 
power—over a country, a government, an organization, a party, or a faction.    
 
Patronage systems can co-exist with more merit-based career systems that are specific to 
particular organizations—the foreign service is often a good example of an enclave civil 
service.  In addition, legal claims to tenure and constraints on firing can constrict 
opportunities to dismiss those who have been appointed through patronage, thus creating 
a de facto civil service.  Even with these constraints, however, many governments 
continue to reserve large numbers of government offices for discretionary appointment, 
often referred to as “confidence” employees in Latin America.  In these systems, then, 
patronage is institutionalized in the sense that it is a generalized rule of the game for 
holding non-elected government positions.   
 
Conceptually and heuristically, patronage systems in public service resemble extended 
pyramids of contracts between superiors and multiple subordinates in which a job in the 
public sector is exchanged for loyalty in some form (see Figure 1).
6  Power in patronage 
appointments thus cascades downward, while loyalty flows upward, culminating with 
some arbiter of employment opportunities—a president, parliamentary leader, party 
official, mayor, or union boss, for example.  Loyalty is personal and can encompass 
mutual commitment to the long life and prosperity of the patron, to a dynasty of family or 
party faction, to a vision of the future or a set of public policy goals, to the hegemony of a 
party machine, to an idea of nationhood, class, or life in the hereafter, and so on.  In 
reality, of course, patronage systems can be riddled with factions and conflict and be 
much messier than indicated in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1 
Structure of a Classic Patronage System 
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Note: This system extends horizontally and vertically 
 
Civil service systems are those in which the preponderance of non-elected public sector 
jobs are filled through a process of credentialing based on education, examination, or 
some other test of merit; in which a career ladder exists and is accessed through 
regularized demonstration of credentials of education, examination, tenure in office, or 
other form of assessing merit; in which tenure is secure barring malfeasance in office; 
and in which movement in and out (through retirement, for example) is regulated and 
compensated.
7  In such a system, the official performs duties for the state or the service, 
not for the patron or the party.  The rules of the game in this system are formal and 
objectified through rules and procedures. 
 
By this definition, career civil services might seem alive and well in Latin America.  In 
2006, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) published a study of the public 
administration systems in 18 Latin American countries.
8  Table 1, which shows IDB data, 
suggests a de jure career civil service in all of them—each of their constitutions enshrines 
such a system.  In addition, in all cases, laws have established a career system.  In eight 
cases, where initial basic laws were nullified by courts, legislatures, or executive decrees, 
more recent legislation reinstituted the systems.  Of course, not all of these provisions 
were quickly put in practice.  In some cases, regulations followed fairly soon after 
legislation, but in Honduras, there was a nine-year gap before a law was provided 
enabling regulations and in Guatemala, the lag was 30 years.  And, the table indicates that 
in seven cases, regulations have not put current legislation into effect.   
 
Table 1 
Career Civil Service Legislation and Regulations 
Latin American Countries, to 2004  
 
Country 
Civil 
Service in 
 
Basic 
Most 
Recent 
Regulations 
for Most 
  4Constitution Law  Basic Law  Recent Law? 
Argentina   1957  1980  1999  2002 
Bolivia 1967  1999  1999  2000 
Brazil 1988  1936  1988  NA 
Chile 1980  1989  2003  No 
Colombia 1992  1992  2004  No 
Costa Rica  1949  1953  1953  1954 
Dominican Rep.  1966   1991  1991  1994 
Ecuador 1979  1978  2004  No 
El Salvador  1950  1961  1961  No 
Guatemala 1985  1968  1968  1998 
Honduras 1957  1967  1967  1976 
Nicaragua 1987  1990  2003  2004 
Mexico 1917  1963  2003  2004 
Panama 1972  1994  1994  1997 
Paraguay 1992  1970  2000  No 
Peru 1979  1984  2004  No 
Uruguay 1967  1943  1943  1943 
Venezuela 1961  1975  2002  No 
          Source: Iacoviello 2006: 567-570 
 
As in all countries, political systems in Latin America also recognize the legitimacy of 
political appointments to some positions.  There are differences, however, in how 
extensively political leaders—primarily presidents and ministers—are granted rights to 
make choices based on their own criteria, as indicated in Table 2.
9  In most cases, 
officially available discretionary appointments fall well under 2 percent of all positions, 
although in Guatemala, Brazil, and Bolivia, political executives are legally entitled to 
much greater leeway to appoint “their people.” 
   
Table 2 
Percentage of Public Sector Positions  
Officially Available for Political Appointment 
2004 
 
Country 
Percent of Total 
Public Sector 
Positions 
Argentina 0.26 
Bolivia 9.00 
Brazil 9.52 
Chile 1.34 
Colombia 1.08 
Dominican Rep. 1.32 
El Salvador  0.78 
Guatemala            17.76 
Honduras 1.68 
  5Mexico 0.37 
Panama 0.71 
Paraguay 0.83 
Peru 0.46 
Uruguay 0.19 
Venezuela 1.60 
      Source: Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2006:52. 
 
Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 might suggest that most countries in the region are staffed 
with officials who belong to a career civil service.  Yet, there are significant differences 
between de jure and de facto practices in the region.  The IDB report indicates, for 
example, that in several countries—Guatemala, Venezuela, Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico, 
and the Dominican Republic—political appointments are accepted de facto down to the 
level of unit or office chiefs and managers, that is, through middle ranges of the public 
administration.
10  In Bolivia, Honduras, Colombia, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, 
politicians regularly make personnel appointments down to the level of department heads 
and department managers.  Politicians in Argentina, Uruguay, Panama, and Chile are 
given the least scope for appointments, with control generally available only over cabinet 
offices and the first level of sub-cabinet offices.  Nevertheless, even in these countries, 
high level officials have considerable scope for appointing “their people” as advisors, 
without having to go through civil service appointment procedures.   
 
Even this assessment probably under-represents the extent to which patronage 
appointments are the norm in many Latin American countries in the 2000s.  As indicated 
above, civil service laws and regulations have not been regularly enforced.  In Ecuador 
for example, 12,000 employees joined the government in 1983; only 300 of them had 
taken the required examination; only 10 percent of overall public sector workers had 
tenure.
11  In Mexico, up to 30,000 positions change hands when new administrations are 
elected.  In Panama, only 18 percent of public positions are not available for patronage 
and some 25,000 employees were dismissed after recent elections.
12  In the Dominican 
Republic, some 3,000 employees incorporated into the career system lost their jobs in 
2004 as a result of a change of government administrations.
13  In Colombia, a 2004 law 
sought to put an end to five years of legal ambiguity in which provisional appointments 
reached 38 percent of the career personnel.
14  In Venezuela, some 7,600 people lost their 
public sector jobs as a result of signing a referendum to recall the president in 2004.
15   
 
While instability of tenure is widespread, not all public officials suffer from it.  In many 
countries, employees at lower levels of the bureaucracy enjoy job security because a 
tenure system has evolved through the unionization of clerks and blue collar workers 
such as maintenance personnel.  In some countries of the region—Mexico is a good 
example—a large number of public sector employees are regulated under labor laws 
rather than civil service laws.  But even with unions, the spoils system can thrive.  Access 
to low level positions is often controlled by union bosses and allocated as patronage for 
party or intra-organizational political reasons.  Thus, although unionization generally 
means extensive constraints on firing, it may not have much impact on issues related to 
recruitment, assignments, and promotions.  Middle level officials, appointed through 
  6patronage, enjoy tenure after appointment in a number of countries also.  This kind of 
stability of tenure does not necessarily mean that a politically neutral regime exists for 
hiring.   
 
In recognition of the gap between de jure and de facto systems, the IDB report indicated 
five levels of merit-based access—appointment through a process of examination or 
competitive concurso—to public service positions in the 18 countries its researchers 
investigated.  Countries ranged from complete discretion in hiring (level 0) to extensive 
coverage of a career public service (level 5).  As indicated, only Brazil ranks high on the 
chart, although Chile and Costa Rica are also acknowledged to have made significant 
progress in implementing a career system.   
   
 
Table 3 
Extent of Merit-Based Hiring 
in Latin American Countries 
2004 
Source: Iacoviello 2006:543, author’s translation. 
Level 
0  (Low)  1 2 3  4-5  (High) 
Panama 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Guatemala 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Ecuador 
Dominican   
Republic 
Bolivia 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Uruguay 
Colombia 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Brazil 
Predominance of 
discretion of 
authorities to 
hire, relocate, or 
fire employees 
Largely 
unsuccessful 
efforts to limit 
discretion in 
hiring, 
promotion, and 
firing 
Merit systems 
live side by side 
with clientelism 
in recruitment, 
selection, and 
hiring 
Predominance of 
technical criteria 
for recruitment, 
hiring, 
promotion, and 
firing of 
personnel 
Open recruitment 
based on 
suitability, with 
guarantees 
against 
arbitrariness.  
Hiring based on 
competence 
using valid 
instruments.  
Mechanisms for 
ingress, 
promotion, 
absenteeism, 
discipline.  Non 
arbitrary firing 
on the basis of 
performance  
 
  7In summary, by the 2000s, most Latin American countries had laws mandating selection 
of public administrators on the basis of merit and setting up equivalents of a civil service 
commission to undertake recruitment and ensure fair treatment and the political neutrality 
of public sector workers.  Yet, despite the consistency of this history throughout the 
region, in the early years of the new century, only Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil recruited 
significant numbers of public sector workers through a structured career civil service 
system.  What happened to the reform initiatives that were so widely legislated in the 
region?   
 
Reformers and Anti-Reformers: Strategies for Change and Resistance 
 
Stories about the fate of career civil service systems are diverse, of course, and each 
country presents a unique tale of reform and resistance to it.  Nevertheless, reformers and 
their opponents in four countries in Latin America indicate a common range of strategies 
for the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of such systems—opting out, 
disestablishment, starvation, re-claiming, re-defining, and re-engineering, as defined in 
Table 4.  In all cases, these strategies had a clear impact on the characteristics of the civil 
service that was put in place, and played a definitive role in the reach and impact of 
reform.  Each of the cases is discussed briefly below; each demonstrates that the politics 
of civil service reform extend over long periods of time, ensuring, at best, only modest 
victories for reformers.  
 
Table 4 
Mechanisms for Resisting Implementation of   
Civil Service Systems in Latin America 
Mechanism of Resistance  Definition 
Opting Out  Resisting incorporation into a 
new civil service regime at 
agency or service level  
Disestablishment  Legislating out of existence an 
agency or commission charged 
with managing a civil service 
system 
Starvation  Reducing the budget of the 
implementing agency to 
impede its function; canceling 
opportunities for examinations 
or concursos.  
Re-Claiming Decentralizing  personnel 
decisions to ministry or 
agency level to thwart system-
wide rules 
Re-Definition  Legislating reduced coverage 
of the civil service system  
Re-Engineering  Inventing means to hire public 
officials outside the 
regulations of a civil service 
system 
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Brazil: Authoritarian Construction and Democratic Deconstruction 
 
In 1937, Getulio Vargas established himself as the head of the Estado Novo, an activist 
and authoritarian regime committed to the rapid transformation of the Brazilian economy 
and society.  The constitution of the regime created a new department—a superministry, 
in effect—the Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, or DASP.  This 
organization was to be a principal means for Vargas to achieve his developmentalist 
goals for the country.  It was to review legislation, draw up the budget, assume 
responsibility for government purchases, and oversee the public administration and 
public buildings.  It would supervise central government personnel and was to implement 
and monitor an examination system for entrance into the public service.  At the state 
level, “Daspinhos” were set up to replicate the activities of the federal department.  
Further strengthening the agency, its direct link to the president helped insulate it from 
the resistance of ministries, including the ministry of finance, which sought to maintain 
more decentralized control over positions at the level of individual ministries.   
 
A central purpose of the new DASP was to put a definitive end to the practice of 
patronage by establishing a new, modern, and technically competent career public 
service.  Nevertheless, its new examination system was initially applicable only to about 
a quarter of federal administrative positions.
16  Positions at middle and high levels of the 
government continued to be categorized as “confidence” posts, available for appointment 
outside of the examination system, and autonomous agencies were excluded from it.  The 
expectation was that the promotion of those entering the service by examination would 
eventually mean that many mid-level confidence posts would be taken over by those 
moving up through the ranks in the career system.
17  
 
The years of the Estado Novo, 1938 to 1945, were golden ones for the DASP.  Its 
influence grew steadily as it proved a useful mechanism for Vargas to centralize control 
and extract autonomy from ministries and agencies.  It focused much of its attention on 
professionalizing the lower ranks of the public service, where the attraction of 
distributing patronage jobs was most seductive.  In addition, the DASP became a center 
for disseminating ideas on proper public administrative structures and processes and 
sponsored seminars, courses, and publications that enhanced the reputation of its 
generally high quality and technically-oriented staff.  As part of its mission, the DASP 
focused on inculcating values of efficiency, professionalism, and technical problem-
solving; it focused blame for the absence of these values on politicians and o sistema, 
referring to the importance of personalism, clientelism, and patronage to how politics had 
traditionally been carried out in Brazil.
18   
 
Its wide-ranging responsibilities, however, placed DASP on a collision course with the 
ministry of finance, which never effectively relinquished control over the budget to the 
new agency.  Moreover, because this super-department was “deliberately used by Vargas 
as an instrument of personal rule,” it was immediately the subject of hostility by 
politicians and administrators who resisted the centralization of power under his 
dictatorship and who identified the DASP with the regime.
19  Its technocratic bias, its 
  9negative framing of politicians, and its strong endorsement of centralization and control 
as means to improve administration did little to win it friends in government.
20 
  
It is not surprising, then, that the DASP faced a hostile reaction in 1945, when Vargas’ 
Estado Novo was overthrown by Brazil’s military and elections for a new government 
were called.
21  Almost immediately, many of its powers were taken away, ministries 
regained control over many personnel decisions, and the DASP’s influence over the civil 
service waned as political parties actively sought votes through the use of pork and 
patronage.  In a decree law of 1945, the DASP was stripped of most of its responsibilities 
other than setting standards, training, and research.  Its budget was reduced by 10 
percent.
22  An important part of the constitution of 1938, DASP was not mentioned in 
that of 1946.   
 
In 1947, legislation drafted by the ministry of finance was introduced to disestablish 
DASP in favor of expanded responsibilities for the ministry of finance and special 
commissions that would organize and manage competitive examinations.  Although this 
initiative failed, the then president declared that budgetary constraints precluded holding 
examinations and made extensive use of temporary appointments to circumvent entrance 
through the DASP system.
23  DASPistas resigned in protest to their diminished status and 
power, a move that was interpreted by new political leaders as evidence of the 
authoritarian preferences of the departments’ personnel.
24  Patronage at all levels was 
justified in part as a feature of democratic systems, in distinction to the authoritarian 
origins of the DASP.  In subsequent years, legislation was regularly introduced in 
congress to eliminate or further diminish the activities of the agency.
25   
 
The DASP continued to exist, but survival was its only claim to fame in the 1950s.  It 
took cover in claiming that it was a purely technical agency of government.  
Simultaneously, the ministry of finance regained much of its influence in the 
management of government affairs and became adept at using budgetary constraints to 
curb the growth of both the career and the appointive civil service.  The budget of the 
DASP declined from 2.2 percent of the national budget in 1945 to 0.3 percent in 1962.
26   
 
And, even though presidents consistently committed themselves publicly to a merit 
system, their actions belied their words just as consistently.  Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-
1961) found patronage an extraordinarily useful way of pursuing his policy agenda of 
rapid industrialization and political support building.  In pursuit of patronage, 
examinations were regularly suspended and efforts were made to “blanket in” temporary 
employees.
27  Only Jânio Quadros (1961) acted in support of entry by examination, and 
began to provide support for reassembling the organization and expanding its training 
mission, but his resignation after 7 months in office put an end to this initiative.  His 
successor, João Goulart (1961-1964), brought patronage to new heights as he appointed 
party members, cronies, and political bosses to public posts.
28   
 
When Goulart was overthrown, military presidents demonstrated a clear disdain for the 
politics of patronage and clientelism.  They blamed o sistema for the inefficiencies and 
corruption that they saw as emblematic of Brazil’s heritage of mass politics and they 
  10sought to centralize and de-politicize the government, and particularly the executive, so 
that it could play a stronger role in stimulating and guiding economic development.
29  
The national interest could best be served, they believed, through the technocratic 
management of government and the expansion of the role of the state in the country’s 
development.  The traditional political elites that managed local, state, and national 
networks of pork and patronage could not be trusted to lead the country anywhere but in 
their own narrow self interest—or so believed the leaders of a regime that was labeled 
one of the prime examples of bureaucratic authoritarianism, albeit one that preserved 
elections and legislatures.
30 
 
Nevertheless, patronage turned out to be a good way to pursue the military’s goals.  
Military presidents took charge of appointment powers and used them extensively to put 
military officials and technocrats in key positions of authority, policy making, and 
implementation, conscious as all leaders are of the importance of loyalty among those 
they rely on to carry out their agendas.  “The new rulers centralized economic policy 
making in the national ministries, strengthened the executive in firm military hands, and 
purged key federal state posts of traditional as well as populist politicians and replaced 
these with uniformed military officers and civilian economists, engineers, educators, and 
professional administrators—the core of a new technocratic elite.”
31  Over time, military 
rulers accommodated their style to an increasing need to establish political support for 
their development agenda.  By the mid-1970s, an expanded state had fully embraced the 
use of patronage not only for its technocratic aims, but also for its political ones.
32  As a 
consequence, several years after the negotiated withdrawal of the military from politics, 
observers of Brazil were hard pressed to find that it had made much impact on o sistema.  
Patronage politics served a useful purpose for the military and did not need to be re-
introduced by the democratic regime that was installed in 1985.   
 
Yet at the same time, the ranks of the career civil service continued to expand across 
administrations and regimes.  Those appointed for temporary, irregular, or non-career 
posts were regularly granted permanent tenure and incorporated into a structure that 
protected them from arbitrary firing or replacement.  A patronage system thus seemed 
capable of living side by side with an expanding career system.  Equally of note, the 
strong reliance on the patronage system did not seem to limit the development of the 
country; presidents, jealously guarding their appointment powers and using them to 
negotiate agreements about national priorities, were often able to make the system work 
relatively well in the interests of economic and social development, even in the context of 
considerable political discord over the distribution of both pork and positions.   
 
In the 1990s, the focus of reformers concerned about the public service shifted away from 
primary interest in the construction and reconstruction of a career system.  An ambitious 
reform of the state to improve performance was undertaken during the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
33  This initiative, one of the first to introduce principles of 
the new public management into the public sector in a Latin American country, was 
focused on reducing the size of the public administration, creating more accountability 
among public officials, increasing the autonomy of many organizations and 
organizational units, privatizing public agencies, and generating a series of mechanisms 
  11in which public services could be produced or co-produced with the private sector or the 
not-for-profit sector.
34  The amendment that put this reform initiative into place also 
made incursions into the career system by placing limits on tenure and capping salaries of 
high level officials in many agencies.  It also reduced some of the privileges of those who 
had positions in the career civil service and sought to incorporate organizations into a 
total quality management program.  Management contracts and performance indicators 
became part and parcel of the language of bureaucratic reformism in Brazil in the 
1990s.
35  Late in the decade and into the 2000s, reform attention shifted to the creation of 
an “entrepreneurial public administration,” whose goals were to bring personnel 
management into closer relationship with the budget and to focus on core careers in the 
civil service as mechanisms for resuscitating a permanent career service.       
 
Throughout its history from the 1930s to the 2000s, then, Brazil’s career civil service was 
constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed on numerous occasions.  At the same time, 
this system continued to coexist with extensive opportunities for personal appointments 
outside the career system.  With some regularity, this appointive power was used 
judiciously by many leaders and managers in high level positions to bring into 
government well-qualified managers and administrators who did not pass through the 
examination system of entry but nevertheless performed their responsibilities with 
relatively high levels of competence.  Despite multiple strategies used by the opponents 
of the civil service, considerable stability and professionalism came to characterize much 
of the public service, whether its members were recruited through patronage or formal 
competitive process.     
 
Argentina: Pushing Reform to the Periphery 
 
Argentina’s experience of creating a Weberian career civil service was a function of a 
massive economic and fiscal crisis that opened up an opportunity for reformers to 
introduce major initiatives and carry them out in short order.  In a relatively short time 
period, a new public service system was created to provide stable, career-trajectory jobs 
for a significant number of public officials.  It was to be implemented comprehensively 
across the federal government.  Yet twenty years after its creation, the number of officials 
incorporated into the system had declined, the size of the public sector had increased, and 
most public functionaries in a position to hire subordinates did so through a system of 
temporary contracts and project management positions that fell outside the career system.  
By the end of the 2000s, the career public service system had been largely pushed to the 
margin by a resurgence of political appointments. 
 
Like other countries of Latin America, the public service in Argentina was long patterned 
on a patronage system inherited from the colonial empire.  In the twentieth century, as 
political parties emerged and became institutionalized features of the political system, 
partisanship was a primary factor accounting for the appointment of public officials from 
the top to the bottom of the public service.  When military governments held power, they 
also used patronage as a means of controlling the state.  In the midst of this patronage 
system, several efforts at reform were attempted, without much impact.  The constitution 
of 1957 guaranteed job stability to public employees without guaranteeing merit-based 
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examination was suspended and a variety of economic measures severely reduced its 
impact.  Other laws and decrees introduced classifications schemes, which, by the 1980s, 
had multiplied into numerous specialized categories that made the management of the 
public service difficult if not impossible.
36  Reformers of the 1980s focused attention on 
training and improved work conditions rather than trying to untangle the complex web of 
classifications in place.
37  An initiative of 1987, modeled on the French experience of a 
high level corps, created the Government Administrators Corps, officials who were to 
serve as master managers across government, assigned where they were needed most.  
Although this service eventually incorporated about 200 highly qualified people, its 
implementation gradually lapsed, with those in this category gradually diminishing over 
time.
38   
 
Just prior to the creation of a new and comprehensive civil service system in 1991, the 
largest number of public officials in Argentina belonged to the category of personal 
convencionado.  These were people who were appointed by discretion and who continued 
to have careers that were determined by the discretion of their superiors or patrons, yet 
they had tenure rights after one year of service and were protected by workers’ rights 
legislation that applied also to the private sector.  In this system, then, there was a degree 
of job stability for many public servants; they could be brought into the system through 
patronage, but remained on the public payroll through a system of tenure.   
 
In 1991, the Argentine government of Carlos Menem, deeply enmeshed in an 
extraordinary economic and fiscal crisis, undertook to introduce a new civil service 
career system.  Much of the ability to introduce it, in fact, was a consequence of the 
crisis.  In the context of a gathering hyperinflation, Menem and the Justicialist (Peronist) 
Party easily won presidential elections in 1989 and moved quickly to implement a series 
of neoliberal economic reforms.  A “law of economic emergency” gave extensive powers 
to the executive to decree policy changes without the need for legislative approval.  The 
reform of the state was encapsulated within a set of laws and decrees to deal with an 
economic emergency, and its main intent was to stabilize the national economy and then 
to reduce the extensive public sector deficit that threatened that stability.
39  Privatization, 
deregulation, and decentralization reduced the size of the national public sector from 
347,000 in 1989 to 200,000 in 1991.
40   
 
The losers of what one official called a “savage downsizing,” and another called a 
“violent reform of the state,” were the large number of employees who were part of the 
national union structure of public officials.  Usually in a position of strength, the scale of 
the economic crisis had put these organizations in a weak position to bargain.  In 
addition, and while there was no direct citizen participation in this reform, public opinion 
supported Menem, given hyperinflation and the depth of the crisis, and provincial 
governors acted as an important support for transferring health and education to the 
provinces.  The most powerful national union of public sector employees bargained in 
favor of a new career system as a way to ensure job stability for at least some of its 
members.
 41  The bureaucracy that remained after downsizing also favored the creation of 
the new system as a way to establish and maintain some semblance of job security.
42 
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The objective of the new system, the Sistema Nacional de la Profesión Administrativa 
(SINAPA), was to create a simpler and clear career system, provide for the meritocratic 
recruitment of officials, and to bring stability and better working conditions to the 
profession of government in the country.  A new Permanent Career Commission, with 
representation in each ministry, would oversee the system.  Seniority would cease to be 
the measure used for advancement from one classification to another; all such promotions 
would be based on competitive processes; within classifications, advancement would be 
through a combination of time in position, annual performance review, and the 
accumulation of credits received by training activities through the National Institute of 
Public Administration (INAP).  In addition, SINAPA established a special category of 
Executive Officials, whose responsibilities included important administrative and 
advisory responsibilities.  Candidates for these positions entered through a competitive 
process, but employers could select among the top candidates, allowing some room for 
discretion.
43   
 
Overall, SINAPA was designed to incorporate some 30,000 positions that would be 
distinct in recruitment and career mobility from the extensive system of personal 
appointment that characterized Argentina prior to the reform.  Indeed, the system got off 
to a good start.  Initially, 22,000 positions were eligible to be classified into the new 
system and about half of those occupying these positions asked to be incorporated into it.  
In 1992, a law granted rights for collective bargaining to public sector employees, and in 
1998-99, the first collective agreement was signed and approved, including within this 
agreement those who were part of SINAPA.  Approximately 40 percent of the total 
number of national government personnel were part of this collective contract when it 
was signed.
44       
 
At the same time, however, most high level officials in Argentina continued to be able to 
hire personal advisors, to constitute, in effect, their own cabinets.  Then in 1995, an 
executive decree opened the door to a return to widespread use of patronage 
appointments.  “Product and service” contracts allowed for hiring people to provide 
services outside the budget for wages and salaries, in effect placing any such 
appointments outside the purview of the civil service.
45  Moreover, through Decree 92 of 
the same year, high level officials were allowed to expand the use of temporary contracts 
for personnel they wished to hire.  Often, renewal in these 180-day temporary positions 
was automatic, at least while their bosses continued to hold public positions and while 
hiring of regular public servants was limited by job freezes.
46  By 2002, there were 
almost 17,000 such appointments, in addition to another 1,200 in projects funded 
internationally, in a total public sector amounting to 116,000 employees.  In addition, 
new job titles, such as “program manager” were introduced outside the SINAPA system, 
adding to the existence of a “parallel bureaucracy.”
47  Ministers thus were able to call 
new initiatives programs so they could benefit from a politically appointed program 
manager.
48  Recruitment to SINAPA positions was suspended in 2000.  A major 
economic crisis in 2001 encouraged those with hiring rights in the public service to 
provide additional jobs for family and friends who lost jobs in other sectors.   
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30,000 positions and then grow managed a portfolio of less than 25,000 jobs, just over 20 
percent of the public service.  In the IDB report on public services in Latin America, 
Argentina was characterized as a country with “very developed processes that are only 
partially used.”
49  Thus, at the end of the 2000s, Argentina had in place a complex system 
of tenured public officials outside a career system, a broad career system, a dwindling 
corps of high level government administrators, and a massive number of temporary and 
contracted employees.  This left considerable space for the continued practice of 
patronage appointments and for politicians and their appointees to marginalize career 
public servants from decision making on sensitive issues, and to side-step them in 
implementation processes.
50 
 
Mexico: Reform and Retreat 
 
Mexico has a long and extremely well coordinated history of patronage in the public 
service.  During more than 70 years of dominant party rule, the Partido de la Revolucion 
Institutional (PRI) operated an efficient clientelist system that originated in an 
extraordinarily powerful presidential office and encompassed most of the public sector 
and the party, down to the most remote village in the country.
51  This system had clear 
rules of the game: new presidents appointed ministers, heads of state-owned enterprises, 
and the mayor of Mexico City.  Presidents were central in selecting nominees to run for 
election as governors, mayors of large cities, deputies and senators for the national 
congress, and could even indicate favored candidates for state level legislative elections; 
those nominated almost always won election given the hegemony of the PRI.  Presidents 
also selected the leadership of the PRI.  Official and friendly unions were headed by 
political appointees who were often selected by the president.  In turn, each of the 
ministers, governors, mayors, PRI leaders, heads of state-owned enterprises, and union 
leaders selected their people, who then selected their people, and so on until the whole 
system could be envisioned as an extensive pyramid of patronage.   
 
This system was legitimized through an important public sector labor law of 1938, which 
made a distinction between “base” personnel—blue collar and many clerical workers—
who would have the protection of labor laws and rights to unionize, and “confidence” 
personnel who could be freely selected for public service by those holding positions of 
authority.  In the aftermath of elections—for which there was a strict rule of no-
reelection—massive numbers of political and bureaucratic positions changed hands.  
Only in a few specialized organizations—the foreign service, the statistics agency 
(INEGI), the electoral institute (IFE), attorney general’s office, and the tax office (SAT) 
are good examples—was it possible to develop a relatively stable career and to move 
upward within the same bureaucracy.
52   
 
Because the system was pyramidal and carefully managed from the top down, patronage 
served a variety of purposes for presidents and the party.  Certainly it ensured 
engagement in political campaigns as activists throughout the country—even in remote 
rural areas—knew that jobs and spoils would be distributed in the aftermath of elections 
to those who worked hard and gained the attention of political bosses at various levels.  
  15In addition, presidents could act relatively effectively on their policy agendas because 
they could select like-minded individuals to occupy leadership positions in key ministries 
and key ministers were clearly aware that they needed to select subordinates who could 
deliver on the shared agenda or they risked losing their jobs.  There was also room in this 
system for awarding loyal union leaders, co-opting dissenters, and undermining the 
appeals of opposition parties.  Perhaps nowhere were political officials more conscious 
that maintaining the political basis of the administrative system—it was a spoils system 
with a purpose, “a functional unit of the PRI.”
53  And yet, the increasing presence of 
technocrats in public positions suggested the sensitivity of the system to the need for 
expertise and modernization in the public service.
54 
 
But success does not last forever, even in well-managed machine politics.  The political 
opening that Mexico began to experience in the 1980s and 1990s—and that resulted in 
the historic 2000 election of a president from an opposition party, Vicente Fox, also 
provided an opening for the introduction of a new career civil service system.
55  Keeping 
a low profile, reformers from the government, in concert with the academic colleagues, 
worked with the members of three parties who had each independently—and for distinct 
motives—introduced reform initiatives.
56  Political consensus in favor of the new system 
was significant and unusual, in large part because of the design of the new system.  It 
focused on middle and higher level positions in a decision not to affect the careers of 
unionized workers; high level representatives of national ministries to the states were 
exempted to reflect concerns among governors; ministries and agencies already claiming 
a career system were exempted; and currently serving officials were given the 
opportunity to opt in or out of the new system.  Moreover, in a context in which congress 
was newly relevant to national decision making, and with a president who did not enjoy 
great support from his own party, the reform provided a means of curtailing the 
traditionally hegemonic position of the Mexican presidency in political life.  In relatively 
short order, a new Servicio Professional de Carerra was introduced and approved by both 
houses of congress without contrary votes.  Regulations, the responsibility of the 
executive branch, were prepared within a year.   
 
The new service was directed toward about 43,000 middle and higher level positions, 
would begin with the third level of appointments in the government—those for general 
director—and would apply only to ministries of the central government.  Those who 
claimed to be part of already established career services—doctors, teachers, foreign 
service and public security officers—were excluded from the new system.  Moreover, 
those currently serving in relevant positions would have a choice of whether to opt into 
the new system or not.  Ministers and deputy ministers would have a reserve of positions 
for “free designation” that would allow them to put together teams of “their people” 
while they were in office.           
 
A new ministry of public service was created and implementation of the plan was to be 
gradual—although not as gradual as the reformers had urged.  With a three year timeline, 
much of the responsibility for the new system working well was to rest with individual 
ministries.  Yet the initial leadership of the new ministry of public service—committed 
reformers—sought a more centralized and rapid implementation of the plan.  Within two 
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taken over a considerable amount of the hiring responsibilities that were to have been 
under the control of the ministries.   
 
For the acceptability of the new system, this approach proved counterproductive.
57  
Added to this, a variety of start-up problems plagued the new system, and little time was 
available for ironing out difficulties before its application was generalized.  In particular, 
the rapid implementation of the system meant that it was not well organized, it was 
confusing, and it was overly complex.  Months might pass before all procedures had been 
accomplished for filling a position, a factor that did little to win friends among officials in 
need of new employees.  In the first years of the new system, about thirty percent of 
positions went unfilled.
58  Performance reviews proved complicated and ineffective.  
Ministries in search of new recruits found ways to avoid or subvert the concursos and to 
maintain their autonomy from the public service ministry.  
  
The new administration of Felipe Calderón in 2006 brought changes that reduced the 
rigidity developing in the new system, but also opened the door to greater discretion in 
hiring.  Under new regulations, ministries were given greater autonomy to implement the 
new system.  When the president announced a reorganization of government ministries, 
the ministry of public functions was conspicuously absent.  While the initiative to 
disestablish the ministry was not successful, the salience of public sector reform slipped 
significantly down the public policy agenda, as Calderón focused on issues of public 
security and drug trafficking.  In this context, politicians and higher level administrators, 
who wanted their people in positions of confidence, found space to begin a counterattack 
on the public service law.  Officials at high levels argued that the initial law had 
inappropriately drawn the line between political and administrative decision making 
posts.  They lobbied hard for a revision to include the position of general director free 
designation by political leaders.  And, as in other countries, the number of temporary and 
contract personnel expanded as public officials found a variety of means to prolong their 
ability to hire “their people.” 
 
Actions for reclaiming, disestablishment, re-definition, and re-engineering combined to 
ensure that the new system would expand tepidly.  At the end of 2007, only 8,300 public 
servants were part of the new system, 2,000 of these as a result of opting in.
59  As in 
other countries, initial experience with the a comprehensive civil service reform indicated
that “The politicians want flexibility,” and they found a variety of strategies for pursuing 
this goa
60
 
l.  
 
Chile: A Professional’s Profession in the Making? 
 
Chile’s public sector has long been characterized by a strongly centralized system, with a 
large allowance for party and presidential appointments.  Although 1930 civil service 
regulations protected employees from some of the ups and downs of national politics, in 
the 1950s additional regulations provided for greater job stability, and in 1960 a reform 
established minimum requirement for recruitment and instituted career opportunities 
based on merit and seniority, the patronage system remained vibrant through the 1960s, 
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61  Informal and formal 
rules tended to be observed simultaneously and, according to one observer, “It was a 
clientelist system, but it was selective clientelism, a kind of career system for those who 
performed well.”
62  And, the number of those benefitting from tenure—even though 
selected on the basis of patronage—grew over time.  
 
One response of new presidents feeling constrained by the rules and partially embedded 
tenured public service was to create new positions and new organizations, sometimes 
paralleling already existing units, thus expanding the size of the bureaucracy to 
accommodate the need for political appointments.
63  The scope for discretion in hiring 
also proved attractive to the generals who took over power by force through a violent 
coup in 1973, and the use of public positions was central to the consolidation of the 
dictatorship.
64  With the return to democracy in 1990, the patronage system aided in 
recolonizing the government with those committed to democracy.  Under the new 
democratic government, the patronage system generally adopted a quota model to 
accommodate a coalition of parties in government.  “There is clear understanding in 
Chile of the need for political balance.  That is why in the past there has always been an 
effort to bring in people across the political spectrum…For example, if a minister is a 
Christian Democrat, then it is tradition to have a Socialist as the vice minister.  If there 
are four directors of services below them, then one would come from each of the 
coalition parties….At the same time, there has been an emphasis on getting really well 
qualified people in government.”
65 
 
Like the Mexican reform, the Chilean evolved out of a close-knit group of academics, 
finding a reform project in their shared concern over the quality of public sector 
leadership in the country.  They did not have much support for their vision, however, 
until a political scandal erupted in 2002.  This crisis arose from a practice of offering 
“envelope salaries,” an informal system to attract well-qualified people to government 
through the delivery of cash to high level officials.
66  The scandal came to light when the 
minister of public works stated publicly that he paid “his people” with an envelope.  
Chileans were mortified when they discovered that what they believed was a very clean 
system of government was hiding so much corruption. The president’s popularity 
declined almost immediately and other scandals further reduced his support.   
 
This became a window of opportunity for the small group of reformers who already had a 
plan to present to the government, which they quickly presented to party leaders.  Under 
great pressure, the party leaders followed the Chilean custom of working out legislation 
within and among parties and then relying on party discipline to ensure legislative 
approval.  There was no public discussion of the reform initiative and congress as an 
institution was peripheral to determining the content of the reform.  “The law was 
designed, it was agreed to by the heads of the party, it was simply presented to parliament 
for vote, with the assurance that a vote would be quick and favorable.”
67  It was 
supported by opposition parties in part because of an expectation that the new system 
would provide them with more opportunities for their partisans in government.   
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terms, was composed of the national director of the Civil Service Office and four others 
who were to represent political parties, was to oversee recruitment procedures.  The 
senate was to confirm the nominees to the commission.  The Commission’s main job was 
to ensure a public competition would result in the selection of three to five qualified 
individuals who could then be recommended to the President for high level positions or 
to the chiefs of services (departments) for second tier appointments.  Those selected 
would be hired for three years on the basis of a contract that spelled out responsibilities 
and expectations for performance, and could be re-contracted for an additional three 
years.  New appointments would only become available when incumbents retired, 
resigned, or were removed from office.  Overall, then, this was an eminently political 
reform, reserving considerable discretion in the appointments process for political and 
personal criteria to be recognized and acknowledging the role of parties in public sector 
recruitment.
68   
 
The new system faced resistance in its initial years.  The political agreement that gave 
birth to the reform law produced only tepid support from the government, which had 
been in a weak position to resist change.  In fact, the government initially tried to resist 
the approval of the law; when that did not seem to be a winning strategy, it sought to 
include many transitional elements in the system to allow for the continuation of political 
appointments and to exclude as many services as possible from the reach of the new 
system.
69  Once the law was passed, the government delayed for a year in appointing 
commissioners to the new commission that would implement the plan.  Then, ministers, 
vice-ministers, and senior managers complained that it often took as much as six months 
to fill a position.   
 
The party opposition also criticized the slowness of implementation and the reluctance of 
the government to initiate open recruitment.  Its management within ministries reduced 
the capacity of the commission to ensure it was working as designed.  At times, those in a 
position to hire personnel rejected all of the candidates put forward and resorted to 
selecting temporary employees to replace the confidence workers they believed they had 
lost.
70  Despite the incorporation of over 100 services by the end of the 2000s, an 
observer summarized the continuing vulnerability of the new system. “The government 
people would rather select their own people and the opposition would like to see a good 
program fail.
71   
 
Conclusions 
 
Reformers of all stripes promote civil service reform as a tonic for corruption, nepotism, 
favoritism, partisanship, spoils, incompetence, lack of professionalism, inequity, capture, 
particularism, mediocrity, malfeasance, and electoral fraud and violence.  In contrast, 
career civil services are thought to bring professionalism, merit, neutrality, uniformity, 
rule-orientation, competence, autonomy, predictability, and continuity to government.  
Indeed, patronage in the public service has no friends—aside, of course, from the 
politicians who provide jobs for “their people” and those who are favored with these 
appointments.    
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Consistently, then, reform rhetoric promises that a proper civil service system will slay 
the greatest of public sector dragons—patronage and the pervasive ills that patronage 
systems visit upon virtuous citizens and societies.  Despite the rhetoric of good vs. evil, 
however, politicians and administrative leaders find numerous advantages in the ability to 
appoint “their people” to public office and thus have an interest in ensuring the 
persistence of such opportunities.  Recent histories of reform initiatives in four countries 
suggest why civil service systems, where they have been introduced, continue to be 
caught in an ongoing political process of construction, deconstruction, and 
reconstruction.   
 
Thus, to a significant extent, how a new system works is a function of the political 
conflicts and compromises that emerge around its implementation.  In the case studies of 
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile, those wishing to maintain discretion in public 
sector hiring adopted a series of similar strategies to halt or constrain the application of 
civil service laws, as indicated in Table 5.  Arguing to be excluded from a new system 
was a strategy adopted by some organizations that had enough political power to do so or 
accepted by reformers as a price for getting legislation passed.  Other strategies focused 
on attempting to end the life of the implementing agency, to starve it of resources, or 
otherwise constrain its activities.  Where centralized systems were put in place, ministries 
and agencies often sought to re-claim the capacity to manage their own appointment 
process.  Ministries of finance were often the most eager to reclaim rights over public 
sector hiring decisions, often claiming that independent commissions and civil service 
ministries would not be concerned about the budgetary consequences of their actions.  In 
addition, new legislation was at times introduced to curtail the scope of the reform. 
 
 
Table 5 
Strategies Employed by Anti-Reformers in Four Countries 
 
Country 
Year of 
Reform 
Legislation 
Mechanisms to 
Impede 
Implementation
Current  
Characteristics of the  
Public Service 
Brazil 1938  Opting  out 
Disestablishing 
Starvation 
Re-claiming 
Re-defining 
Re-engineering 
Strong reputation for 
competence 
Pockets of efficiency managed 
at agency level 
Alternatives to civil service 
reform to improve bureaucracy 
Argentina 1991  Starvation 
Re-claiming 
Re-defining 
Re-engineering 
Parallel bureaucracy 
Pockets of efficiency managed 
at agency level 
Stalled reform initiative 
Mexico 2003  Opting-out 
Disestablishment
Re-claiming 
Re-definition 
Modest reputation for 
competence 
Pockets of efficiency managed 
at agency level 
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Chile 2003  Opting-out 
Re-claiming 
Re-engineering 
Strong reputation for 
competence 
Limited impact of high level 
reform 
 
The table suggests that most commonly, hiring officials adopted the practice of bringing 
“their people” in through temporary appointments or as advisors who serve at the 
pleasure of their bosses.  There were also opportunities to create parallel organizations 
with special hiring codes and salaries, to staff state-owned enterprises and agencies not 
subject to regular personnel rules, to bring in additional and contract employees, to create 
special “islands” with their own personnel regulations and codes, and to set up executive 
and implementing units for special programs.  The case studies indicate that from middle 
level administrators to top level advisors, many of those appointed to public office 
continue to be subject to hiring and firing at will.      
             
Does this pervasive “push back” from those who benefit from patronage mean that we 
must characterize the civil service reforms in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile as 
failures?  Certainly there is clear evidence that they were slow to be implemented and 
were consciously distorted or marginalized as they were put into effect.  But the case 
studies also provide some evidence that over the longer term, procedures for ensuring a 
more neutral and stable public service in Latin America have gained ground, although not 
always through the development of full civil service system.   
 
Over long periods, initiatives for reform have been redefined and undermined, but have 
continued to leave some legacy within the public service.  Brazil and Chile are perhaps 
the best examples of the evolution of relatively stable tenure and incorporation into what 
is recognized in each country as a civil service with some autonomy from politics.  
Mexico and Argentina have farther to go to create more stability and autonomy, but these 
countries have also made some progress toward these goals, most notably at the level of 
individual organizations that have been able to develop their own career or quasi-career 
systems.  This ability to infuse the public service with greater stability and autonomy was 
the consequence of a series of initiatives across numerous decades—creating rules about 
recruitment and categories of personnel and their careers in deliberate civil service reform 
initiatives, and also through organizationally-specific initiatives and bottom-up tenure 
processes.   
 
Along with the slow accumulation of such legacies, many would agree that in these cases, 
even that of the highly politicized system in Mexico, the degree of competence and 
professionalism in government has been on the rise.  Thus, even where patronage has 
continued to flourish, it can be used at times to infuse government with more professional 
and competent management.  In all four countries, over time, the level of education of 
middle and upper level public officials has improved, with large proportions of public 
officials now boasting higher education.  The image of the sleepy, inefficient, 
unresponsive, and corrupt public official who is the brother-in-law of a political hack 
remains current in rhetoric, but can be belied by evidence in some countries. 
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The introduction of civil service systems and merit hiring is an important objective for 
reformers in Latin America.  Expectations about what such systems can achieve, 
however, need to be moderated.  Civil service systems do not always mean better or more 
responsive government.  In Table 6, the IDB data demonstrate that when the degree of 
merit in hiring practices is separated from assessments of public sector efficiency and 
capacity, scores in Argentina indicate considerable success in achieving the latter two 
characteristics without necessarily scoring high on the former.  In contrast, Brazil’s 
scores indicate that high marks on merit hiring are not enough to ensure the best 
standards for efficiency and effectiveness.  Scores for Chile suggest less divergence and 
those for Mexico are closely aligned.  These data indicate that much remains to be done 
to improve the performance of public sectors in many countries in Latin America, and 
also that a merit hiring is not the only measure of such improvement.   
 
Table 6 
Scores for Three Characteristics  
Of Latin American Public Sectors 
2004 
Country Efficiency Merit Capacity 
Argentina 50  31  47 
Bolivia 32  22  19 
Brazil 56  87  61 
Chile 59  62  47 
Colombia 42  52  48 
Costa Rica   40  58  57 
Dominican Republic 38  19  26 
Ecuador 16  18  19 
El Salvador    8    9  17 
Guatemala 29  18  17 
Honduras  15  17    9  
Mexico 39  41  40 
Nicaragua 28  15  15 
Panama 10  2  13 
Paraguay 16  20  12 
Peru 16  18  14 
Uruguay 47  52  44 
Venezuela 38  35  38 
                 Source: Longo 2006:582. 
 
It would, of course, be disingenuous to argue that patronage does not contribute to 
incompetence and corruption in many Latin American countries, although it is perhaps 
impossible to know how much because many countries of the region also have weak 
institutions, lax regulatory systems, and arcane legal processes that can be part and parcel 
of poor performance and corrupt practices.  Nevertheless, there is much truth to the 
assertion that the widespread use of patronage in Latin American public sectors facilitates 
“clientelistic practices, corruption or amiguismo,” conditions inimical to economic, 
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72  At the same time, and as we have seen, party identity and 
personal loyalty as criteria for appointment to office can coexist with more focused uses 
of patronage.  Because such systems tend to be controlled by political executives and to 
be pyramidal in operation, ministers and other high level officials have the capacity to 
use their appointment power to attract highly qualified staffs to carry out specific policy 
initiatives—although of course, not all choose to do so.  In some cases, significant 
instances of policy change can be partially attributed to the flexibility of patronage.
73  In 
these cases, the focused use of patronage has encouraged the responsiveness of 
bureaucratic actors to executive policy leadership and the rapid implementation of new 
policy initiatives. 
 
The fatal weakness of patronage systems is not that they inevitably lead to incompetence 
but that they are capricious, subject to the whims and ends of those who manage them.  
Civil service systems are designed to end capriciousness with regularized rules about 
recruitment and career development.  Thus, civil service systems offer a well-trod path 
toward more regularized government, more stable administrative systems, and greater 
bureaucratic autonomy from partisanship and political capture.  This paper suggests that 
this path is a rocky one in Latin America, but also that it has not been embarked upon 
completely in vain.  Legacies of law and practice have accumulated and can serve as a 
basis for further change.  The histories of civil service systems in many countries indicate 
slow and halting progress rather than all-or-nothing reform success and failure.   
 
Indeed, the path toward very halting reform may in fact be the path through which 
patronage systems will eventually be supplanted by career civil service systems—slowly, 
incrementally, and adaptively.  This was certainly the experience of the United States.  
Conflict and negotiation have characterized movement from one form of public sector 
recruitment to another, and this generally results in a protracted period of co-existence 
between patronage and career systems.  Latin American countries that have undertaken 
serious initiatives to reform the public service are no doubt functioning with this 
protracted time frame.  If the question is “how is capriciousness and private and party 
interest minimized or removed from the administration of government?” this paper 
indicates that the answer is “slowly and gradually.”   
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Notes 
 
1 U.S. Civil Service Commission, Report to Congress, (date, page unknown), quoted in Skowronek 1982, 
pp. 78-79). 
 
2 See especially Skowronek 1982 for this argument. 
 
3 See especially Erie 1988 for a discussion of the distribution of patronage by party machines at local and 
state levels and national policy initiatives. 
 
4 The literature on implementation of public policies in developing countries is considerable.  See, for an 
example, Grindle (1980).  
 
5 Patronage, of course, is not practiced solely by governments; for our purposes, however, I focus only on 
the use of patronage as a means for acquiring positions in government.   
 
6 Historically, patronage systems long predated any conception of a “public” sector.  Indeed, patronage 
systems proved durable across the transformation from the private households of early rulers to the “public 
realm” of the state and the nation. 
 
7 Max Weber outlines these characteristics to demonstrate that public officials in a modern bureaucracy 
pursue a career of administration and work as servants of the state, not of patrons, kings, or other 
individuals.  See Weber 1946:196-204. 
  
8 See Echebarría 2006; Iacoviello 2006; and Longo 2006a and 2006b.  For a summary of the findings, see 
Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2006. The report focuses on seven “subsystems” of public sector management—
human resource planning, the organization of work, employment, performance, compensation, management 
of development (training), and human and social relations.  It presents five indices related to efficiency, 
merit, structural consistency, functional capacity, and integrative capacity. 
 
9 Information in this paragraph is taken from Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2006:53, based on a typology 
developed by Oszlak 2003.  Countries in each category were designated based on conditions existing in 
2004. 
 
10 Iacoviello and Zuvanic (2006:54) do not list Mexico in their categories.  I have added it, based on my 
research. 
 
11 Ruffing-Hilliard 2001:600. 
 
12 Longo 2006b:605. 
 
13 Longo 2006b:606. 
 
14 During those five years, there was no law in place to regulate the civil service. Iacoviello 2006:545. 
 
15 Iacoviello 2006:545. 
 
16 Geddes 1994:53. 
 
17 Siegel 1978:68-69. 
 
18 Siegel 1978:77.  For additional information on public secgtor reform in Brazil, see Graham 1968; 
Graham 1990; and Schneider 1991. 
 
19 Lambert 1969:176.   25
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20 Siegel 1978:79. 
 
21 See, in particular, Siegel 1978:Chapter 5. 
 
22 Siegel 1978:99. 
 
23 Lambert 1969:180. 
 
24 Siegel 1966:49; 1978:93-94. 
 
25 Siegel 1978:106-107, 
 
26 Siegel 1978:147. 
 
27 Siegel 1978:Chapter 6.  “Blanketing in” refers to the practice of appointing partisans to positions in 
government and then incorporating these positions into the civil service system so that incumbents acquire 
tenure.  This is an important way in which civil service systems in many countries have expanded over 
time—politicians have blanketed in their supporters and the positions they hold then accrue to the formal 
personnel system. 
 
28 Geddes 1994-59-60. 
 
29 Hagopian 1996:2, Chapter 3. 
 
30 O’Donnell 1973; Hagopian 1996:107-108. 
 
31 Hagopian 1996:104. 
 
32 Hagopian 1996:151-152. 
 
33 See especially Bresser-Pereira 2003; Gaetani and Heredia 2002. 
 
34 On the contents of the reform, see Bresser-Pereira 2003. 
 
35 Bresser-Pereira 2003:94. 
 
36 Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2004: 74. 
 
37 Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2004:74. 
 
38 Nevertheless, during the economic crisis of the early 1990s, this corps provided a highly professional 
base for the planning of a number of government responses, including the creation of a new career civil 
service.  By the late 2000s, only about 120 people remained in the corps.  Interview, Oscar Oszlak, July 6, 
2009.  See also Iacoviello and Tommasi 2002:7. 
 
39 See, for example, Madrid 2003:Chapter 4. 
 
40 Acuña 1994:46. 
 
41 According to one observer, the career system was “candy given to the union for allowing downsizing to 
take place.” Interview Mercedes Iacoviello, July 8, 2008. 
 
42 Individual interviews Jorge Giles,  Fernando Straface, Fernando Martin Jaime, July 7, 2008. 
   26
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Early criticism of this process focused on how job descriptions could be tailored to specific candidates, a 
situation criticized as having a correct methodology but an implementation system that left room for 
patronage and clientelism. Bonifacio 1995:6. 
 
44 Iacoviello and Tommasi: 2002:10. 
 
45 Ferraro 2004:7; Ferraro 2006:173. 
 
46 Iacoviello and Tommasi 2002:3 (check all page numbers  up through 11– not on copy I have) 
 
47 Iacoviello and Tommasi 2002:45; Iacoviello 2006:545-546. 
 
48 Ferraro 2006:171. 
 
49 Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2004:82. 
 
50 Ferrero 2006:166. 
 
51 See Smith 1979 for a description of how the system worked. 
 
52 The oldest of these systems was the foreign service, which introduced concursos in 1922.   
 
53 Grimes and Simmons 1969. 
 
54 See Grimes and Simmons 1969; Centeno 1999. 
 
55 On the Mexican reform, see Martinez Puon 2005; Merino 2006; and Mendez 2008. 
 
56 Méndez 2008:12. 
 
57 Mendez 2008:15. 
 
58 Mendez 2008:16. 
 
59 Herrera Macías 2008:29. 
 
60 Interview David Arellano Gault, April 18, 2008. 
 
61 Parrish 1973:242. 
 
62 Interview Alfredo Rehren, July 2, 2008. 
 
63 Parrish 1973:244. 
 
64 Remmer 1991:134-135.  Pinochet is reported to have said, “Not a leaf moves in this country if I am not 
moving it!” Quoted in Remmer 1991:138. 
 
65 Interview Jose Jara, June 30, 2008. 
 
66 Sobresueldos were so named because they were above (sobre) regular salaries (sueldos) but also because 
the cash was delivered in envelopes (sobres). 
 
67 Interview Jose Jara, June 30, 2008. 
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68 For details, see Ramírez Alujas 2009; Costa and Waissbluth 2007; for additional information, see 
Garretón and Cáceres 2003.  
 
69 Costa and Waissbluth 2007:20. 
 
70 Costa and Waissbluth 2007:13. 
 
71 Interview Rosanna Costa, July 3, 2008. 
 
72 Echebarria 2006:vii, author’s translation. 
 
73 The neoliberal reforms so widely adopted in the 1980s and 1990s in many Latin American countries 
were often put in place and supported by ministries of finance and economics whose hiring policies were 
patronage-based but whose results were the recruitment of extensive technocratic talent into government.  
Similarly, when ministers or presidents sought to implement extensive new policies for urban development, 
social protection, or poverty reduction in the 2000s, many relied extensively on personally selected 
ministers and agency heads who in turn recruited through patronage with an eye toward policy impact.  
Political executives have also used the allocation of positions in government to forge legislative coalitions 
that make it possible to act boldly in introducing new policies. 
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